Ten themes in the foreign policy of a changing kingdom

Documented policy

The Saudi–Iranian–Chinese joint statement of 10 March 2023 affirmed respect for the sovereignty of states and non-interference in their internal affairs. When Iran struck targets in the Kingdom in March 2026, the ministry affirmed Saudi Arabia’s “full right to take all necessary measures to safeguard its security, sovereignty”, and on 21–22 March declared Iran’s military attaché and four embassy staff persona non grata while keeping the ambassador in Riyadh.

Interpretation

CSIS analysts, writing in 2026, described Riyadh as seeking to avoid becoming a party to the war while signalling that it would defend itself — a distinction that the decision to expel embassy staff but not sever relations illustrates.

Documented policy

Diplomatic relations with Iran, cut on 3 January 2016, were restored by the Beijing agreement of 10 March 2023. In Yemen the Kingdom backed the UN-mediated truce of April 2022 and welcomed the UN envoy’s roadmap commitments of 23 December 2023.

The minister

He held the follow-up meetings with Iran’s foreign minister in Beijing (April 2023) and Tehran (June 2023). On 8 September 2026, after Houthi attacks on Saudi territory, he said in Moscow that the Houthis “have started something they cannot handle”, while Asharq Al-Awsat reported him as saying the door to diplomacy remained open.

The minister

At AlUla on 5 January 2021 he announced the end of the boycott of Qatar that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt had imposed in June 2017, and a full restoration of relations.

Interpretation

Analysts at AGSI and elsewhere have documented an open divergence between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi from December 2025, over southern Yemen, over Sudan and, after the UAE left OPEC and OPEC+ with effect from 1 May 2026, over oil policy. Both governments describe the relationship in their own terms; this archive records the divergence without adjudicating it.

Documented policy

The Arab Peace Initiative, proposed by then Crown Prince Abdullah and adopted at the Arab League’s Beirut summit on 28 March 2002, offers normalisation in return for withdrawal to the 1967 lines and a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital. On 5 February 2025 the ministry stated that the Kingdom’s position was “non-negotiable” and that it would not establish relations with Israel without an independent Palestinian state.

The minister

He launched the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution (2024) and co-chaired the UN conference that produced the New York Declaration (2025).

Documented policy

A Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China since January 2016; a Strategic Defense Agreement with the United States, signed on 18 November 2025, under which Saudi Arabia was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally; OPEC+ coordination with Russia since 2016; a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement with Pakistan signed on 17 September 2025. Saudi Arabia accepted SCO dialogue-partner status in 2023 and has attended BRICS summits “as an invited country” without formally confirming membership.

The minister

“So I don’t ascribe to this zero-sum game. I think we are all capable of having multiple partnerships and multiple engagements, and the U.S. does the same in many instances.”Riyadh, 8 June 2023 — US State Department transcript

Documented policy

Vision 2030 was launched on 25 April 2016. According to its 2025 annual report, non-oil activities accounted for 55 per cent of real GDP in 2025. The Kingdom won the vote to host Expo 2030 on 28 November 2023 and was confirmed as host of the 2034 FIFA World Cup on 11 December 2024.

Editorial analysis

Many of the minister’s bilateral frameworks — coordination councils with Türkiye and Brazil, strategic dialogues with Japan and Germany — combine political consultation with economic agendas, reflecting how closely diplomacy and the Vision 2030 programme are linked.

Documented policy

Saudi Arabia helped found OPEC in Baghdad on 14 September 1960 and signed the OPEC+ Declaration of Cooperation in Vienna on 10 December 2016. On 2 August 2026, seven OPEC+ producers including Saudi Arabia agreed a production adjustment for September.

Context

Al-Monitor reported on 10 September 2026 that Saudi crude output reported to OPEC for August 2026 fell to 6.238 million barrels a day, the lowest since 1990, as disruption to shipping through Hormuz and, from July, Houthi attacks affected export routes.

Documented policy

The Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition, announced in December 2015 and headquartered in Riyadh; the Council of Arab and African States bordering the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, whose charter was signed in Riyadh on 6 January 2020; the defence agreements of 2025 with Pakistan and the United States.

The minister

On 31 August 2026 he attended in Istanbul the first meeting of the committee established under the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, as reported by Anadolu Agency and Al Jazeera.

Documented policy

The King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre (KSrelief), established on 13 May 2015, had by the end of August 2026 funded 4,457 projects worth US$8.57 billion in 113 countries, according to figures reported by Arab News. Yemen is by far the largest recipient.

The minister

At the UN General Assembly in September 2025 he cited more than US$141 billion in Saudi aid over the Kingdom’s history, as reported by the Saudi Press Agency; in Kyiv in February 2023 he signed a US$100 million humanitarian programme.

Documented policy

The Kingdom hosted a meeting of national security advisers on Ukraine in Jeddah in August 2023, US–Russia talks in Riyadh on 18 February 2025 and US–Ukraine talks in Jeddah on 11 March 2025, and facilitated, with the United States, talks between Sudan’s warring parties from May 2023.

The minister

He attended the 2025 talks as host alongside the National Security Adviser. At the UN in 2024 he pointed to the release of prisoners “of different nationalities” and said the Kingdom stood ready to continue its mediation.